UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-4-2014

Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v.
Elmore County Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
42175

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Elmore County Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 42175" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court
Records & Briefs. 5161.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5161

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,
Supreme Court No. 42175-2014
Petitioner-Appellant,
Elmore Co. Dist. Court No. CV-2013-720
Consolidated with Case No. CV-2013-722

vs.

ELMORE COUNTY and THE BOARD OF
ELMORE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Respondents-Appellees.
In re: T.A. and T.O.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Elmore, Honorable Lynn G. Norton, District Judge, Presiding
ROBERT A. BERRY, #7742
Elam & Burke, P.A.
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

Kristina M. Schindele, #6090
Jessica L. Kuehn, #9059
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office
190 South 4th East
Mountain Home, ID 83647

Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center

Attorneys for Respondents-Appellees Elmore
County and the Board of Elmore County
Commissioners

Michael R. Chapman, #5972
Chapman Law Office, PLLC
PO Box 1600
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816

Michael J. Kane, #2652
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC
PO Box 2865
Boise, ID 83701-2865

Attorney for Amicus Kootenai Health

Attorney/or Amicus !AC

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

II.

ARGUl'vfENT ...................................................................................................................... 2
A.

III.

The Applications Contained the Requisite Signatures and Information for
the Third Party Applications .................................................................................... 2
1.

Idaho Code § 31-3504(1) Does NOT Require Applications to Be Signed
by Both a Patient AND Third Party Applicant. .......................................... 2

2.

Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) Does Not Support the County and IAC's
Position \Vhen Read Together with Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) ................... 3

3.

The County's Arguments as to Who Must Sign and Where Are Not
Supported by both the Application and the Code ....................................... 4

4.

The Applications Contained "Personal Information" ................................. 6

B.

Saint Alphonsus May file Third Party Applications Even \Vhere the
Patients Refuse to Sign an Application, because it is a Real Party in
Interest ..................................................................................................................... 7

C.

Third Party Applications Do Not Violate a Patient's Rights under the
Code ......................................................................................................................... 9

D.

The IAC' s Burden-Shifting Standard is Not the Law under the Code .................. 10

E.

The IAC and County Disregard the Legislative History and Purpose
Behind the Code ..................................................................................................... 11

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 14

TABLE OF AL'THORITIES

Cases
Brown v. Caldwell School Dist., 127 Idaho 112, 117 898 P.2d 43, 48 (1995) ............................... 4
1vfercy Afrd Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226,230, 192 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2008) ................. 1
Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Afed'l Ctr. v. Ada County et al., 146 Ida,_11.o 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502,
503 (2009) ..... ··············································· .................. ······················· ·························· ...... 8, 11
Sewardv. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 138 Idaho 509,512, 65 P.3d 531,534 (2003) .................... 8
St. Luke's jvfagic Valley 1vfed'l Ctr. Ltd v. Bd of County Com 'rs of Gooding County, 150
Idaho 484,488, 248 P.3d 735, 739 (2011) ................................................................................. 7
St. Luke's Reg'! 1vfed'l Ctr. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs ofAda County, 146 Idaho
756-59,
203 P.3d 683, 686-89 (2009) ................................................................................................ 8, 11
Univ. of
Hospital v. Ada County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-1 153 P.3d
1154, 1156-58 (2007) ··························································································· 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
Wheeler v. Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988, 991.. ....................... 2

Statutes

Idaho Code § 9-1406 ....................................................................................................................... 5
Idaho Code§ 31-3501 ................................................................................................................... 12
Idaho Code§ 31-3501 et seq .......................................................................................................... 7
Idaho Code§ 31-3502(2), (19), (26) ............................................................................................... 4
Idaho Code § 31-3502(26) ........................................................................................................ 8, 11
Idaho Code§ 31-3502(7) .............................................................................................. 2, 3, 4, 6, 12
Idaho Code § 31-3503(4) .............................................................................................................. 11
Idaho Code§ 31-3503(c) ................................................................................................................ 2
Idaho Code§ 31-3504 ................................................................................................................. 3, 8

11

Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) .............................................................................................. 2, 3, 4, 9, 10
Idaho Code§ 31-3504(2) ............................................................................................................ 3, 9
Idaho Code§ 31-3505A .................................................................................................................. 9
Idaho Code§ 31-3505A(l) ............................................................................................................. 7
Idaho Code§ 31-3505A(2) ............................................................................................................. 7
Idaho Code § 3 l-3505E .................................................................................................................. 7
Idaho Code§ 73-101 ....................................................................................................................... 7
Idaho Code§§ 31-3502(7) &-3504(1) ........................................................................................... 5
Title31,Chapter35,IdahoCode ............................................ l,2,3,4,5,6, 7,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13
Other Authorities

House Bill 310 ................................................................................................................................ 8

I.

INTRODlTCTION

The response briefs by both the County and the Idaho Association of Counties ("IAC")
demonstrate somewhat surprising indifference to the purpose of the Medical Indigency Act
("Title 31, Chapter 35, Idaho Code" or "the Code"), which is to provide for medical care and
treatment to their residents and also to provide for payment of such services when the Counties
do not construct their own facilities to provide their own medical care and treatment. A prima
facie case is for proving medical indigency has long been settled, and consists of (1) residency in
the obligated county; (2) indigency from a standpoint of lack of resources; and (3) medical
necessity of the treatment. Afercy 1Hed. Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226, 230, 192 P .3d
1050, 1054 (2008).
Despite this, the County and IAC have now argued that a new element must be met
before any mandatory investigation begins. They argue that an application must be "complete"
under a tortured reading of both Idaho's medical indigency laws and the combined application
prepared by the Department of Health and Welfare ("IDHW") and used in the medical indigency
process.

If not "complete" they argue, then they have no obligation to investigate, issue

subpoenas or go beyond the inquiry as to whether or not the application was even complete. The
position overturns long-standing principles and law under the Code.

The hospital has no

subpoena power unlike the County. It cannot compel a patient's attendance and cannot compel a
patient or applicant to sign an application. Nevertheless, even though Saint Alphonsus, as a third
party applicant, may expressly file an application under Idaho's laws, per the IAC and County, it
car..not be "complete" absent the patient's or applicant's signatures. Their position effectively
reduces the medical indigency process outlined by statute and case law into a legal game of
"gotcha" to provide the County with a quick avenue to deny applications rather than fulfill their
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duties in investigating and evaluating medical indigency applications. The County's argument is
contrary to the language of the Code, the form of the Application that has been adopted to satisfy
the Code, as well as Idaho precedent allowing for applications to be submitted by hospitals
where an applicant refuses to cooperate. Finally, it places too great a burden on hospitals to
secure signatures from patients who refuse to sign or even cannot sign due to death or incapacity.
The position of the counties should not be condoned and the matter should be remanded to the
Board so that they may conduct their mandatory investigative duties under the Code.
II.

ARGUlVIENT

In a nutshell, the County's argument is that the third party applications vvere incomplete
because they lacked the patients' signatures. 1 (See Appellee's Brief§ IV.B. l, pp. 25-30.) The
argument runs counter to Idaho Code § 31-3504(1 ), the language of Idaho Code § 31-3502(7),
and the form of the Application itself that is mandated by Idaho Code § 31-3503(c).

It

effectively renders the term "third party applicant" meaningless. Finally, it runs completely
contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent allowing for third party applications where patients
refuse to cooperate or sign applications.
A.

The Applications Contained the Requisite Signatures and Information for
the Third Partv Applications.
1.

Idaho Code § 31-3504(1) Does NOT Require Applications to Be
Signed by Both a Patient AND Third Party Applicant.

The disconnect in the County's argument as to who must sign an application is found at
pages 27-28 of the Appellee's Brief where the County states "that a third party applicant is

As an initial matter, the County recites a burden regarding completed applications that is
not found in the Code and is not discussed in Wheeler v. Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 147
Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988, 991.
1
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required to present an application in the same form and manner as an applicant. LC. § 31-3504.
This would include all necessary signatures." The Code actually reads as follows:
(2) If a third party completed application is filed, the application shall be
presented in the same form and manner as set forth in subsection (1) of this
section.
Idaho Code§ 31-3504(2)(emphasis added). Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) identifies the necessary
signatures. It demonstrates that the signatures of both an "applicant" and "third party applicant"
are not required, which is made amply clear in the following provision through the use of "QI":
The completed application shall be signed by the applicant or third party
applicant, an authorized representative of the applicant, QI, if the applicant is
incompetent or incapacitated, someone acting responsibly for the applicant and
filed in the clerk's office."
Idaho Code§ 31-3504(l)(emphases added). Accordingly, the signatures of a patient or applicant
are not necessary signatures in a third party application; otherwise, the Code vvould have read
that the "completed application shall be signed by the applicant. ..

It was error for the Board

and the District Court to hold otherwise.

2.

Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) Does Not Support the County and IAC's
Position When Read Together with Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1).

As noted in Appellant's Brief, Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) provides none of the specificity
that the District Court and the County or IAC insist is required. Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) does
not say that the cover sheet or the first page of an Application has to be signed. It does not say
that the patient rights and responsibilities or releases need to be signed. While it contains the
oblique statement that the applications contain "all other signatures required in the application,"
it does not specify who needs to sign and where. (Id.) Given that § 31-3502(7) does not specify
who needs to sign and where, and that Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) expressly allows an application
to be filed by a third party applicant or applicant, Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) cannot be read to
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require both of their signatures. The language simply is not present in § 31-3502(7) or § 313504(1 ).

Accordingly, as Saint Alphonsus noted in its Opening Brief, the specific

determinations of who needs to sign and where were legislatively assigned to IDHW to make,
and, in tum, IDHW determined what signatures would be required in the Application and where
they would be necessary.
3.

The County's Arguments as to Who Must Sign and \,Vhere Are Not
Supported by both the Application and the Code.

The arguments in relation to the Application form itself by both the County and IAC
render the term "third party applicant" meaningless.

·while they argue that the patient and

applicant must have signed a third party application, neither § 31-3502(7) nor § 31-3504(1)
is contrary to the language of the Code.

support this argument. It is simply their
Effectively, however,

also appear to be arguing that Saint Alphonsus, as a third party

applicant, should have nonsensically signed the Applications in the designated spaces actually
meant for the patient, applicant, or co-applicant even though these terms have distinct and
defined meanings under the Code. Idaho Code§ 31-3502(2), (19), (26). Under the County's
interpretation, this is to presume that the legislature performed an idle act by enacting a
meaningless provision, which is a method of statutory construction that is not condoned. See,

e.g., Brown v. Caldwell School Dist., 127 Idaho 112, 117 898 P.2d 43, 48 (1995)("A statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be rendered
superfluous or insignificant. Further, we do not presume that the legislature performed an idle
act by enacting a meaningless provision.") Moreover, given that the very amendment in 2011
that created the definition of "completed application" uses the term "third party applicant" or
"third party application" twenty-three times; their arguments belie what the legislature intended.
(See Exhibit A to the Amicus Brief filed by the IAC.)
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Accordingly, a third party application is different than a first-party application and the
signatures required for one are different than the other. In other words, a third party application
does not require all of the signatures of the patient, applicant, or co-applicant.2 As such, Saint
Alphonsus appropriately did not sign page 1 of the Application, which only calls for the
signature of the "applicant" or "co-applicant" and not the "third party applicant."

It

appropriately did not initial the "Patient Rights and Responsibility for State and County
Assistance" since those rights and responsibilities relate to the patient and not those of the "third
party applicant." However, it appropriately signed the designated area for third party applicant
that was designed by IDHW. Finally, it appropriately did not sign the page 10 or the release,
because, again,
and not for the

space requiring a signature is for the patient, applicant, or co-applicant
party applicant.

In summary, Saint Alphonsus signed at every space

designated by IDH\V to sign as a third party applicant. It therefore appropriately followed the
form of the Application itself as well as Idaho Code §§ 31-3502(7) & -3504(1), because the
signatures of the patient, applicant, and/or co-applicant were not necessary signatures.
As to the svvorn statement issue on page 9 of the Applications, Saint Alphonsus submits
that the last part of

form is insufficient to constitute a sworn statement. The at-issue portion

is found within the section pertaining only to "For County Assistance" under the "Patient Rights
and Responsibilities for State and County Assistance." The entire area is phrased as "rights" or
"responsibilities" of the Patient or Applicant; they are not phrased as "svvorn statements" or
"sworn declarations" or, to use Idaho Code§ 9-1406 as an example since it was enacted at a later
date, even close to the language found in it. The at-issue section itself contains no language as to

Indeed, under the County's reasoning, if a patient submitted a first-party application that
was not signed by the third party applicant, then it would be an incomplete application, which
simply makes no sense, especially in the context of the entire purpose of the Code.
2
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any averment as to the truth of the contents therein. Nevertheless, the at-issue section is not
phrased to relate to a third party applicant that is a hospital such as Saint Alphonsus. First, again,
the box is contained within the "Patient's Rights and Responsibilities" Section and even then it is
a right or responsibility that applies only in the section "For County Assistance." There is no
similar provision in the section "For State Assistance."

Second, and most importantly, the

language is phrased to apply to the patient or applicant and not a third party applicant, because
the very first identified entity is a hospital: "If I give false or misleading information to a hospital
... " In other words, this right or responsibility does not apply to a third party applicant such as
Saint Alphonsus, because under the County's logic, it would read as follows: "If Saint Alphonsus
gives false or misleading information to Saint Alphonsus." As noted in Appellant's Brief, there
simply is no place in the form of IDH\V's applications that specify where the Applications
should be sworn to the truth of the matter asserted.
4.

The Applications Contained "Personal Information".

As above, the County attempts to address the lack of meaning to the terms within Idaho
Code § 31-3502(7) by stating that the other code provisions, when read in conjunction, flesh out
their meaning. (Appellee's Brief, p. 31.) The difficulty for the County, however, is that none of
the other Code provisions contain the specific categories of information found in the Application.
None of the Code provisions require the provision of a telephone number or email address and
there is nothing in the Code speaking to their import. 3 Additionally, the County continues to
adhere to its belief that the Applications were incomplete because they contained answers such
as "No" "un..1<.nown" and "n/a." (T.O. R. at 172; T.A. R. at 118.) Clearly, information was

The County argues that this information would have assisted the Clerk in performing
her statutory duties,
this runs squarely counter to its position, as well as that of the IAC, that
the County does not have to do anything if the application is incomplete.
3
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provided, but the statute fails to specify what exactly is necessary to meet the requirement of
"personal information."

Again, these findings, which presumably go to the "personal

information of the applicant" 4 phrase within the code section, are not defined by the Code.
Moreover, third party applicants do not have to have complete knowledge of all matters
necessary to establish eligibility (Idaho Code § 31-3505A(2)) and any information that
presumably is missing or unverified, becomes part of the County's mandatory duty to
investigate. Idaho Code § 31-3505A(l )("The clerk shall promptly notify the applicant, or third
party filing an application on behalf of an applicant which, if omitted, may cause the application
to be denied for incompleteness").

The position of the County also ignores the Code's

provisions that allow the patient and providers to produce additional information, documents,
records, and testimony all the way through an appeal hearing of an initial determination of
denial. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 3 l-3505E. Accordingly, the arguments raised by the County
regarding "incompleteness" of the Applications are unavailing and the District Court's
determination on this specific issue should be upheld.
B.

Saint Alphonsus Mav file Third Partv Applications Even \Vhere the Patients
Refuse to Sign an Application, because it is a Real Partv in Interest.

The IAC mischaracterizes a hospital's rights under the Code when it notes that there was
a '"long standing policy' of the courts to allow hospitals to stand in the shoes of patients when
applying for payment." (IAC Amicus Brief, p. 6.) There was no such policy. Instead, there is
and was a right of the hospital to seek reimbursement under the Code, because counties, for

Even though this provision was amended, the amendment has no bearing on the appeal
since Idaho laws are not applied retroactively and there is no expression to the otherwise
regarding the aiuendments to the Code. See Idaho Code § 73-101; see generally Idaho Code §
31-3501 et seq.
Court is to consider the Code as it existed at the time an application for
county assistance is filed. St. Luke's kfagic Valley Afed'l Ctr. Ltd. v. Bd.
County Com
of
Gooding
1 Idaho 484,488,248 P.3d 735, 739 (2011).
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most part, do not construct, maintain, staff and operate hospitals or otherwise provide medical
care and treatment on their own, which is their obligation under Idaho law. Saint Alphonsus is in
fact a real party in interest under the Code and it does not stand in the shoes of the patient. St.
Luke's Reg'! A1ed'l Ctr. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs ofAda County, 146 Idaho 753, 756-59, 203 P.3d 683,

686-89 (2009); Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Jvfed'l Ctr. v. Ada County et al., 146 Idaho 862, 863, 204
P.3d 502, 503 (2009). Accordingly, as noted in Appellant's Brief, any claim made by a provider
is not derivative of a patient; rather, providers such as Saint Alphonsus may file as third party
applicants independently, especially where the patients fail to cooperate, as is the case here.
Idaho Code § 31-3502(26); St. Luke's Reg 'l A1ed 'l Ctr. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada County, 146
Idaho 753, 203 P.3d 683 (2009); Saint Alphonsus Reg'l ivied'! Ctr. v. Ada County et al., 146
Idaho 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009); Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Bd. of
Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-12, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007). The recitation of law and

authority to Seward v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 138 Idaho 509, 512, 65 P.3d 531, 534 (2003)
does not change this fact, because, again, "[t]he legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn
long established principles of law unless an intention to do so plainly appears by express
declaration or the language employed admits of no other construction." St. Luke's Reg 'l 1vfed 'l
Ctr. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada County, 146 Idaho 753, 758, 203 P.3d 683, 688 (2009). There is

nothing in House Bill 310 or the Session laws that evidences any express declarations that Saint
Alphonsus may not file and pursue county assistance when patients, such as here, refuse to sign
an application for county assistance. Clearly, the Legislature was not attempting to eliminate
third party applications as the purpose statement even says: "AMENDING SECTION 31-3504,
IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR

COMPLETED APPLICATION FOR FINANCIAL

ASSISTANCE TO PROVIDE FOR A THIRD PARTY APPLICANT .... " (See Exhibit A to
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the Amicus Brief of the IAC, p. 13.) Again, the Legislature saw fit to include the term third
party applicant or third party application twenty-three times in the 2011 legislative changes.
Accordingly, the many references to and use of the term "third party" do not support the IAC or
the County's contention that providers may not file and pursue county assistance when patients
refuse to sign an application for county assistance.

C.

Third Partv Applications Do Not Violate a Patient's Rights under the Code.

The County argues that the patient's signatures are required so that the providers,
counties and the CAT board may share confidential information regarding the applicant's health
and finances, and that without the patient's signature it has no jurisdiction to consider a noncompleted application as that would violate the
rights.

(See Appellee's Brief, pp. 27-28.)

and letter of the Act as well as

patient's

However, this position is contrary to the literal

language of Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) & -3504(2),

also has been squarely

by the

Idaho Supreme Court, specifically in Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Bd of Comm 'rs, 143
Idaho 808, 810-12, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007). It is contrary to the mandatory duty to
investigate by a County and belies the subpoena power that the Legislature has provided to
counties in order to fulfill its duties. Id. at 811, 153 P.3d at 1157; Idaho Code§ 3 l-3505A. As
noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, the "[t]he investigative duty is mandatory and cannot be
eliminated simply because the patient cannot or will not cooperate." Id at 811, 153 P.3d at
1157. The County's position is also at odds with the legislative intent of the Code, something
which the County did not discuss below at the District Court level. Finally, it is also difficult to
understand how the patients' rights would be violated
Code.

reimbursement was awarded under the

The patients here needed medical services and received the medical services, but

nevertheless, could not pay for them. Even though the Code specifically envisions
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very

scenario, nevertheless, the County is now saying that it violates the patients' rights for Saint
Alphonsus to attempt to get the Applications approved. 5 Again, this argument and position has
been squarely rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Bd.

ofComm'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-12, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007).

D.

The IAC's Burden-Shifting Standard is Not the Law under the Code.

The IAC contends that an application cannot be filed by anyone other than an applicant
unless there is "authorization" or "a demonstration that the applicant is incompetent or
incapacitated." (IAC Amicus Brief, p. 3 .) This statement is closely related to the County's
contention in briefing before the District Court that Saint Alphonsus could have easily obtained
the applicants' signatures. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, Respondent Elmore County and
the Elmore County Board of Commissioners' Opening Brief filed November 8, 2013, p. 16).
The burden that the IAC requires simply does not exist under the Code and the County's
argument is speculation and contrary to the record before this Court. As made clear above, there
is nothing in the language ofldaho Code § 31-3 5 04( 1)

requires a third party applicant to first

obtain authorization to file an application or demonstrate that a patient is incompetent or
incapacitated. It is a burden that does not exist, but one that the IAC and County appear to want.
The Code does not allow Saint Alphonsus to force a patient to sign an application, which is the
reason the Code allows for third party applications, and there is no authority that allows a
hospital to unilaterally obtain a general release or limited power of attorney without the patient's
consent. The Code also does not allow a county to force a patient to sign an application. In this
matter, both patients refused to sign the applications in front of the hospital and the County. The
One suspects that if the County were to actually build, maintain and staff their own
hospital, and provide necessary medical services to a resident, that once a resident refused to sign
an application for county assistance, the refusal to do so would not preclude the County from
attempting to seek reimbursement for the services that were provided.
5
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County admitted as such in its additional statements of facts where it noted that T.O. failed to
respond to a letter requesting an interview; failed to respond to a subpoena commanding T.O.'s
presence; and when T.O. appeared for the interview, he refused to cooperate and sign the
application. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, Respondent Elmore County and the Elmore
County Board of Commissioners' Opening Brief filed November 8, 2013, p. 7.) Similarly with
T.A., the patient failed to show to the scheduled interview and failed to return a follow-up
interview.

(See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, Respondent Elmore County and the Elmore

County Board of Commissioners' Opening Brief filed November 8, 2013, pp. 7-8.)

In no

mariner could Saint Alphonsus have "easily obtained" either patient's signatures. Accordingly,
Saint Alphonsus filed a complete application as a third party applicant as allowed by the Code
and existing law. Idaho Code§ 31-3502(26); St. Luke's Reg'l ]vfed'l Ctr. v. Bd.
Ada County, 146

Comm'rs of

753, 203 P.3d 683 (2009); Saint Alphonsus Reg'l J\lfed'l Ctr. v. Ada

County et al., 146 Idaho 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009); Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada
County Ed. ofComm'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-12, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007).
E.

The IAC and Countv Disregard the Legislative History and Purpose Behind
the Code.

The County did not contest the legislative intent and purpose behind the Code as set forth
by Saint Alphonsus when it was before the District Court. All of its legislative intent and history
arguments are now therefore raised for the first time on appeal, which is improper. Regardless of
its impropriety, the County, when it had the chance before the District Court, did not contest the
general intent behind the Code and the fact that counties ,vere given the jurisdiction and power
"to provide county hospitals and public general hospitals for the county and others vvho are sick,
injured, maimed, aged ... and to erect, enlarge, purchase, lease, or otherwise acquire, and to
officer, maintain and improve hospitals, hospital grounds . . . . " Idaho Code § 31-3503(4).

1, 1l

Elmore County did not contest that it has chosen not to erect or purchase its own hospital to care
for its medically indigent residents. While it does so now on appeal, it did not contest that the
Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a provider's right to payment for medical services rendered
is independent of the applicant: "In keeping with the second prong of this policy, we have held
that a patient's refusal to cooperate under the medical indigency statutes does not terminate a
provider's right to seek payment."

University of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Board of

Commissioners, 143 Idaho 808, 811, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). It also did not contest then that the Board's construing of Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) in a
narrow and confined fashion was and is at odds with the general intent of the Legislature, which
is clearly expressed

Idaho Code§ 31-3501. It did not contest below that the determination

undercuts the very core of the Medical Indigency Act and is contrary to the general intent of the
Legislature clearly expressed therein.

It also did not contest then that the Legislature was

sensitive to a provider's right to seek payment for medical services provided to indigent persons,
and thus afforded a provider the right to seek and receive payment.
The County and IAC's position has been crystalized now on appeal. Their arguments are
squarely at odds with the general intent of the legislature. Instead, they seek to end-around
clearly established legislative intent by attempting to create artificial technical barriers such that
providers like Saint Alphonsus, who provide medical care and treatment to their residents, will
not have a right to seek and receive payment under the Code if their own residents refuse to
cooperate and sign an application. Under the County and IAC's idealization and construction of
Idaho's medical indigency laws, whenever Saint Alphonsus provides a medically indigent
Elmore County resident medical services, the patient could refuse to cooperate and Saint
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Alphonsus would be precluded from seeking any relief under the Medical Indigency Act. Their
arguments and approach undercut the very purpose of the Code and are meritless.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Board's decision
denying the medical indigency applications be REVERSED and the matters REMANDED for
further investigation by the County in accordance with its statutory duties under Title 31,
Chapter 35, Idaho Code.
DATED this

'-/

day ofNovember, 2014.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
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R
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